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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
In the Interest of
Elsie Johnson Black
Emily Johnson Black
Vaughn Johnson Black
Ivan Francis Johnson Black
Wilford Marshall Johnson Black
Orson Johnson Black
Lillian Johnson Black
Spencer Leon Johnson Black,

Case No.
8220

Alleged neglected, dependent children,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELlANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced upon petition of
Jay

R~ Hunts~~n,

Probation Officer of Washington
1
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County, Utah, to have the subject children declared dependent, neglected children contrary to
the provisions of the statutes of Utah.

The

matter was heard by the Juvenile Court of the
Sixth District, in and for Washington County,
State of Utah, before David F. Anderson, Judge,
on March 20, 1954, and the subject children were
adjudged and decreed on May 11, 1954, to be neglected children within the meaning of the laws
of Utah and the natural parents, Leonard Black
and Vera Johnson, deprived of custody and control
of the said children, and the said children made
wards of the courto

The custody and control of

the children was awarded by the court to the Utah
State Department of Public Welfare, but the children were to be permitted to remain with their
parents upon certain specific conditions.

From

this Decree and Judgment this appeal is taken upon
all questions of law and facto
2
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GTATENENT OF THE FACTS
The Juvenile Court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, after hearing in
this matter, to the effect that the subject children were neglected within the meaning of Section
55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that the
parents of the children should be deprived of
their custody and control, this conclusion being
based on 19 findings of fact drawn to indicate
that these children, who live with their mother
in Short Creek, Utah, were not being provided with
"the proper maintenance, care, training and education contemplated and required by law and morals."
The parents of these children are what is
comrnonly known as Fundamentalist Mormons, accepting as the Law of God the doctrine of Plural and
Celestial Marriage as, in their sincere religious
convictions, that doctrine was revealed and restored by God through his Prophet Joseph Smith in

3
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Sec~ion

132 of Doctrine and Covenants of the Church

of Jesus Christ

ar

Latter Day Saints.

The commun-

ity in which they jive is essentially a pioneering farming cownunity on the Utah-Arizona border,
the great majority of the residents of which hold
to the same religious beliefs as do these parents.
The Juvenile Court was unable to find any
evidence that these children were being deprived
of any of the essentials of life and, in
fact, in Findings of Fact 16 specifically found
"That there was no evidence that any of the children were destitute and without proper sustenance,
clothing or medical care."

Nevertheless, the

Juvenile Court concluded because af the religious
beliefs of the parents and their neighbors that
their home constituted an immoral enviornment for
the rearing of the children, this despite the
fact that these parents had ceased to cohabit as
man and wife prior to the filing of the petition
4
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in this matter.
The children are all in good health, are
being given all the educational opportunities
available in the community, and are being raised
by their parents in such a manner as to greatly
enhance their prospects of becoming exemplary
citizens of both state and nation.
The Juvenile Court in its Decree and Judgment, however, declared and adjudged these children to be neglected children within the meaning
of the laws of Utah, depriving the parents of
their right of custody and control of the children, and made the children wards of the court.
The court then awarded the right of custody
and control of the children to the Utah State
Dep~rtment

of Public Welfare, authorizing the

Department to place the children in suitable
foster homes, but permitting the children to remain in the actual custody of their parents,
5
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provided the parents would meet certain conditions.
The conditions specified by the court would require
the parents to submit a sworn statement to the
following effect:

That they would agree to com-

ply with the laws of Utah relating to marriage
and sexual offenses; that they would refrain from
counseling, encouraging and adv1sing their children
to violate such laws, but would counsel and advise
them to obey such laws and that they could satisfr
this latter requirement not merely by "the pretense
of telling the children that they have 'free agency', but it is intended that the parents shall affirmatively encourage their children to abide by
the laws of Utah, and that the children should do
so in disregard of any religious doctrines to the
contrary"; that they would report to the probation
officers with the children monthly, and that they
would file a written sworn statement with the court
each month of compliance with the court's requirements.
6
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The Juvenile Court further ordered in its
Decree and Judgment that its judgment should not
be stayed pending an appeal to this court, taking
its authorization from Section 55-10-35, Utah
Code Annotated.
The parents of these children being unable,
without violating their consciences, to file the
oath demanded by the court, the children in due
course were forcibly taken from their mother by
the officers of the Juvenile Court and the Department of Public Welfare and were placed in a
home in Utah

C~untyo

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANTS RELY
Point 1.

The Decree and Judgment is un-

constitutional and void in that subparagraph (f)
of subparagraph 3 thereof requires the parents
to swear that they are willing to comply with the
requirements

o~

subparagraph 3{a) through (e),

7
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which require the parents to report to the court
once a month and file with the court each month
an affidavit to the effect that they have complied
with the laws of Utah relating to marriage and
sexual offenses; that they have refrained from
counseling, encouraging and advising the children
to violate such laws; that they have counseled
and advised the children to obey such laws not
merely by telling the children that they have
11

free agency", "but it is intended that the

parents shall affirmatively encourage their
children to abide by the laws of Utah, and that
the children should do so in disregard of any religious doctrines to the contrary," which requirements are contrary to the provisions of Sections
1, 4 and 15 of Article 1 of the Constitution of
Utah and Amendments 1 and 14 of the Constitution
of the United States of America, in that said requirements violate the constitutional guarantees
8
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of freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
Point 2.

The Decree and Judgment operates

to take the custody of children from their natural
parents without due process .of law, the court having no jurisdiction to enter the Decree and Judgment which it has entered, all of which constitutes the taking of life, liberty or property
without due process of law in violation of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America and Section 7 of Article I of
the Constitution of Utah.
Point 3.

Section 55-10-35, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, under which the juvenile court
in subparagraph 5 of its Decree and Judgment purports to act in stating that the execution of its
judgment shall not be stayed pending an appeal,
is unconstitutional if it can be invoked in a
case like the case at bar, in that, it is a violation of due process of law and an overextension of the doctrine of parens patreae, under

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which doctrine Juvenile Court statutes must be
justified.
Point 4e

Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotat-

ed, 1953, under which the Juvenile Court in 1. of
its Conclusions of Law finds the children "neglected children" is unconstitutional, in that it is
vague and uncertain.
Point 5.

The Findings of Fact 14, 17, 18 and

19 are not supported by the evidence, and said Findings of Fact being essential to the Conclusions
of Law entered by the court, said Conclusions of
Law are, therefore, not based upon the evidence
before the court, and the Judgment and Decree
based upon said Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is, therefore, erroneous.

ARGUMENT

Po:J.nt 1.

The Decree and Judgment is un-

constitutional and void in that subparagraph (f)
of subparagraph 3 thereof requires the parents
10
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to swear that they are willing to comply with the
requirements of subparagraph 3(a) through le),
which require the parents to report to the court
once a month and file with the court each month
an affidavit to the effect that they have complied
with the laws of Utah relating to marriage and
sexual offenses; that they have refrained from
counseling, encouraging and advising the children
to violate such laws; that they have counseled
and advised the children to obey such laws not
merely

qy telling the children that they have

"free agency", "but it is intended that the
parents shall affirmatively encourage their
children to abide by the laws of Utah, and that
the children should do so in disregard of any religious doctrines to the contrary," which requirements are contrary to the provisions of Sections
1,

4 and 15 of Article 1 of the Constitution of

Utah and Amendments 1 and 14 of the Constitution
of the United States of America, in that said re11
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quirements violate the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and freedom of religion.
Subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Subparagraph 3
of the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile Court
are as follows:
"(b) That the narePts and each of them
shall at all times r~fra.in from counseling,
encouraging and advising the children to violate the laws of Utah relating to marriage
and sexual offenses.
"(c) That the parents and each of them
shall counsel and CA.dvise the children to obey
the laws of Utah relating to marriage and
sexual offenses. This requirement shall not
be satisfied by the pretense of telling the
children that they have 'free agency', but
it is intended that the parents shall affirmatively encourage their children to abide
by the laws of Utah, and that the children
should do so in disregard of any religious
doctrines to the contrary."
Subsection (f) of subparagraph 3 of the said
Decree and Judgment requires the parents to submit
a sworn statement to the court of willingness to
comply with its requirements as a condition to
their retaining the actual custody of their children.
The court is, in effect, saying to these parents
12
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and to the mother in particular, that in their
own home they cannot teach their own religion to
their own children.
The First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States of America is as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of re~igion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances."
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States of
America is, in part, as follows:
No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to r:.r~y
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
11 • • •

The pertinent portions of the Article 1 of
the Constitution of Utah are as follows:
SECTION I
"All men have the inherent and inalien-

13
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able right to enjoy and defend their lives
and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates
of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
SECTION 4
"The rights of conscience shall never
be infringed. The State shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no
religious test shall Qe required as a qualificatio~ for any office of public trust or
for anv vote at any election; nor shall any
person be incompetent as a witness or juror
on account of religious belief or the absence
thereof. There shall be no union of Church
and State, nor shall any Church dominate the
State or interfere with its functions. No
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support
of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qm~lification shall be required of any
person to vote, or hold office, except as
provided in this Constitution.
SECTION 15
"No law shall be passed to abridge or
restrain the freedom of speech or of the press ••• "
The right of people to be free of governmental
interference in their own homes has long been recognized in English and American jurisprudence.

14
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Lord Coke's maxim in Semayne's case is an example:
"The house of every one is to him as his castle
and forttess, as well for his defense as for his
repose."

It is well to note also the words of

the elder Pitt in his speech on the Excise:

"The

poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to
all the force of the Crown.

It may be frail; its

roof may shake; the wind may enter - but the King
of England cannot enter.

All his forces dare not

cross the threshold of the ruined tenement."
The Juvenile

Cour~

in this matter seeks to

enter the home these parents provide for their
children and to force the parents to tell their
children that what they conscientiously believe
to be the word of God should be disregarded by
these children.

This would seem to be a novel

concept of the powers of American Courts, for
diligent search does not reveal a case in which
the courts have attempted to exercise such authority, and it ··is inconceivable that had any court

15
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so acted its action would not have been challenged
by appeal to higher tribunalso

The higher courts have not had too great an
occasion to deal with decisions or lower courts
which go so far as to declare, in effect, what is
a right or a wrong belief in God, as does the
Juvenile Court in this case, but when called upon
to do so they have been quick to say that such
is not the province of the courts.

Ann. Cas. 1914A., at pages 752 and 753 quotes
from In re DOYLE, 16 Moo Appo 159, with reference
to the right of a parent to teach his religion to
his children and the power of the courts to take
· their custody from him for such teaching, as follows:
"A great deal has been said in the argument as to the religious question. In
determining what will be best for the child,
we cannot, under the system of law we are
appointed to administ~r, look at that. The
state or which we are citizens and officers
does not regard herself as having any competenc.y in spiritual matterso She looks with
equal eye upon all forms of so-called Christianity and subjects no one to any disability
for rejecting the generally accepted doctrines

16
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of natural religion. A father in Missouri
forfeits no right to the custody and control
of his child by being, or becoming, an atheist,
nor are his rights in this respect increased
before the law by his behaving rightlyo The
law does not profess to know what is a right
belief ••• It is manifest that anything which
interferes with the natural right of the
father to direct the religious education
of his child strikes a blow at the family,
which, in the last analysis, is the foundation of the state. Few men would be willing to assume the burdens of a legal paternity, if they supposed that their children
could, against their will, be taken from
them to be educated in religious systems
which they believed to be false, and to be
taugh+ thus to despise their father for his
superstition, or for his infidelity, as the
case might be. To thP. Protestant, the
Catholic religion must be a system of superstition; to the Jew, it must be one of imposture, and to the unbeliever, the old
historic religions of the Jew and the Catholic, and the various sects of Protestantism,
are alike false, and the profession of any
of them a confession, so far, of moral or
intellectual weakness. I can conceive no
more poignant anguish than that of the true
father who sees his child, against his will,
brought up before his eyes in a religious
system which he abhors, as being, according
to his belief, injurious to the spiritual
interests of his child; and, if he believes
sincerely in any form of religion, his anguish at seeing his child brought up in religious indifferentism cannot be less ••• "
The record in this case is replete with references
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to the religious beliefs or the people involved.
Mr. Knowlton in his statement to the court at the
beginning of the hearing on page 3 of the transcript of the testimony said ". • • Mr. Black, and
his entire family had accepted as true the 132nd
Section of the DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS of the L.D.S.
Church ••• "

Much of the testimony at the hearing

revolved around the religious beliefs of the parents and the children and the likelihood of the
children following those beliefs in violation of
Utah statutes.
In UNITED STATES v. BARLOW 56 FoSupp. 795

(1944), to be discussed more fully below, the
court was dealing with a matter involving people
who professed the same faith in God as do the
people who were before the Juvenile Court in
this caseo

On page 796 of the report the court

sets out an editorial from TRUTH MAGAZINE which
substantially sets out that faith, at least in
so far as it differs with the faith of the mod18
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ern Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.
The editorial as quoted by the court is, as follO\-rs:
"'The Lord restored the principle of
Celestial or plural marriage in line with
his promise that in this the last dispensation there would be a restoration of all
things and -4-,ha t there should be no taking
away again. Plural marriage is one of the
laws of Heaven that has been restored never
again to be taken from the earth or given
to another people. It is a law that cannot
be abrogated, modified or postponed. The
hackneyed claim that the Woodruff Manifesto
of 1890 was given by revelation from the
Lord to abrogate His law of Plural Marriage
has been exploited by the leaders to a
shocking degree, and as often has been explodedo Any person with 8th grade intelligence reading the Manifesto will discover
nothing in it savoring of revelation, or
as an injunction from the Lord against the
continued practice of the principle. True,
the subsequent interpretation given it by
Wilford Woodruff, while under pressure by
the enemy, and so far as it was ratified by
the Church, bound the Church to a monagamic
marriage system. But it was the Church that
was bound, and not God~"
What the Decree and Judgment of the Juvenile
Court does, in effect, is to say that these things
may not be taught by these parents to these children.

This is nothing more than the court saying
19
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that the position of one faction is correct and
that of the other faction is wrong.

American

courts are not called upon to arbitrate these
matters.

This question was considered by the

court in GLOVER
(1912).

v~

BAKER, 67 N.H. 393, 83 A. 916

The case concerned the validity of a

trust set up by the will of Mrs. Mary Baker Eddy,
the founder of the Christian Science religion.
Chief Justice Parsons dealt with the matter of
courts concerning themselves with the truth of a
particular faith on p. 932 A, as follows:
"With the truth of the religious theories
inculcated the court has no concern. Even if,
upon examination of Mrs. Eddy's writings, the
me~bers of thP court should entertain the
opinion expressed by Sir John Romilly of
Joanna Southcate in Thornton v. Howe, and believe her to be 'a foolish, ignorant woman',
and her teachings absurd and illogical delusions, the personal opinions of the members
of the court would not affect the question.
Mrs. Eddy had the conAtitutional right to entertain such opinions as she chose, to make a
religion of them, and to teach them to all
others; and their rights of belief are as extensive as hers ••• Whether her opinions are
theologically true 1 the courts are not camP etent to decide. • u
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Another case which took up this matter was
KNOWLTON v. BAUMHAVER, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N. W.
202 (1918).

The case involved the question of

sectarian teaching in the public schools.

The

court held that sectarian teaching must be kept
out of the public schools.

In considering court

interference with religion the court quoted, at
page 208 N.W., the following from Board v. Minor,
23 Ohio St. 211, 13 Am. Rep. 233:
rttTrue Christianity asks no aid from the
sword of civil authority. It began without
the sword, and wherever it has taken the
sword it has perished by the sword. To depend on civil authority for its enforcement
is to acknowledge its own weakness, which
it can never afford to do. It is able to
fight its own battleso Its weapons are
moral and spiritual and not carnal ••••••
True Christianity is a solecism, a contradiction of terms. When Christianity asks
the aid of government beyond mere impartial
protection, it denies itself •••• The state
can have no religious opinions; and i f it
undertakes to enforce the teaching of such
opinions, they must be the opinions of some
natural person, or class of persons. If
it embarks in this business, whose opinion
shall it adopt? ••• Let the state not only
keep its hands off, but let it also see to
it that religious sects keep their hands
21
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off each other. Let religious doctrines have
a fair field, and a free, intellectual, moral,
and spiritual conflict. The weakest,-that is,
the intellectually, morally, and spiritually
weakest- will go to the wall, and the best
will triumph in the end. This is the golden
truth which it has taken the world 18 centuries
to learn and which has at last solved the
terrible enigma of 'church and state' •••• The
state will impartially aid all parties in
their struggles after religious truth, by
providing means for the increase of general
knowledge, which is the handmaid of good government, as well as of true religion and morality. It means that a man's right to his own
religious conviction and to impa:rt them to
his own children, and his and their right
to engage in harmless acts of worship toward the Almighty, are as sacred in the eyes
of the law as his rights of person or property, and that, although in the minority, he
shall be protected in the full and unrestricted enjoyment thereof. '"
The position of governments with respect to
religion is considered in ILLINOIS ex rel MCCOLLUM
v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S. Ctc 461,

92 L.Ed. (Adv. 451), 2 A.L.R. 1338 (1948). The
case dealt

with the use of public school property

for religious instruction and held such use unconstitutional.

Justice Black in his opinion in

A.LoR., p. 1347, quoted from Everson v. Board of
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Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 s.ct. 504, as follows:
"'Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over anothero Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or
for professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion was intended to
erect 'a wall of separation between church
and State."'
The issue is dealt with in COOLEY ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIHITATIONS 7th Ed., P• 663, et seq.,
nThose things which are not lawful under any of
the American constitutions may be stated thus:"1. Any law respecting an establishment
of religion. The legislatures have not been
left at liberty to effect a union of Church
and State, or to establish preferences by
law in favor of any one religious persuasion
or mode of worship. There is not complete
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religious liberty where any one sect is
favored by the State and given ~jvantage
by law over other sects. Wha\,'3V3r establishes a distinction against one class or sect
is, to the extent to which the disti~ction
operates unfavorable, a persecution; and i f
based on religious grounds, a religious persecution. The extent of the discrimination
is not material to the principle; it is enough
that it creates an inequality of right or
privilege •••
"4. Restraints upon the free exercise
of religion according to the dictates of the
conscience. No external authority is to place
itself between the finite being and the Infinite
when the former is seeking to render the homage that is due, and in a mode which commends
itself to his conscience and judgment as being
suitable for him to render, and acceptable
to its object-_
"5. Restraints upon the expression of
religious belief. An earnest believer usually
regards it as his duty to propagate his opinions, and to bring others to his views. To
deprive him of this right is to take from him
the power to perform what he considers a most
sacred obligation ••• "
And on p. •673
"The constitutional provisions for the
protection of religious liberty not only include vri thin their protecting power all sentiments and professions concerning or upon the
subject of religion, but they guarantee to
everyone a perfect right to form and to promulgate such opinions and doctrines upon religious
matters, and in relation to the existence, power,
attributes, and providence of a Supreme Being as
24
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to himself shall seem reasonable a:nd correct.
In doing this he acts under an awful responsibility, but it is not to any human tribunal."
And on p. 676,
"Whatever deference the constitution or
the laws may require to be paid in some cases
to the conscientitous scruples or religious
convictions of the majority, the general
policy always is, to avoid with care any compulsion which infringes on the religious
scruples of any, however little reason may
seem to others to underlie them ••• "
The broad nature of these guarantees is considered by the Massachusetts Court in GLASER v.
CONGREGATION 1\..EHILIATH ISRAEL, 263 Mass. 435,
161 N.E. 619, (1928).

In speaking of the pro-

tection of religious liberties by the Massachusetts
Constitution on p. 620 N. E., the court said,
"These great guarantees of religious
liberty and equality before the law of all
religions are not confined to adherents of
the Christian religion or to societies and
corporations organized for the promotion of
Christianity. They extend likewise to the
adherents of the ancient religion whose sacred
scriptures form a part of the Bible. We are
of the opinion that Jew as well as Christians
are protected by these explicit declarations
of religious equality ••• 11
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In STATE v. LEVIN, 109 N. J. Law. 503,

162 A. 909 (1932), the Court, in dealing with
the right of witnesses to testify where they refused because of conscientious scruples

to take

an oath, being atheists, said, on Page 912A.,
"We consider that the constitutional
provision is a direction that the belief
or the disbelief of any person on religious
topics shall not debar him from rights which
the law affords to others."

In MACINTOSH v. UNITED STATES, 42 F. (2d) 845,
(1930), the court held that citizenship was improperly denied an applicant who was a conscienti6us objector to bearing arms.

Judge Manton dis-

cusses the rights of individuals to worship God
unmolested on page 848, as follows:
"··· Story in his work on the Constitution, vel. II ~ 1876, says, 'The rights of
conscience are, indeed, beyond the just
reach of any human power. They are given by
God and cannot be encroached upon by human
authority, without a criminal disobedience
of the precepts of natural, as well as revealed religion'. The rights of conscience
are unalienable, which the citizen need not
surrender and which the government or society
cannot taKe away.
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"'Every individual has a natural and
unalienable right to worship God, according
to the dictates of his own conscience and
reason'; and it is also his 'natural and unalienable right' not to be 'hurt, molested,
or restrained in his person, liberty, or estate for worshiping God in the manner and
season most agreeable to the dictates of his
own conscience, or for his religious profession, sentiments or persuasion', provided
he does not disturb others.' Hale v. Everett,
53 N. H. 9, 6o, 16 Am. Rep. 82. "
Another case considering the scope of the
freedom is U,:WIS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK
CITY, 285 N.Y.S.

164 (1935).

In a case involving

the reading from the Bible in the public schools,
in speaking of religious freedom, at page 169 the

court says,
"The sanctified principle of freedom of
religious belief does not distinguish between
believers and nonbelievers. It embraces both
and accords one as much protection and freedom
as the other. A sect or tenet which is intolerant of those of a different sect or tenet
is the precise antithesis of religious liberty.
Freedom is negated if it does not comprehend
freedom for ·those who believe as well as those
who disbelieve. The law is astute and zealous
in seeing to it that all religious beliefs or
disbeliefs are to be given unfettered expression. Authentic free thinking involves
the indubitable right to believe in God, as
well as the unfettered license not to believe
or to disbelieve in a Diety."
27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These authorities indicate that the courts
of this country should never place themselves,
directly or indirectly in the position of favoring one creed over another.

The decision of the

Juvenile Court places it squarely in a position
of favoring the teaching of the creed of the
modern Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints as opposed to the teaching of Fundamental
Mormonism with respect to the truth of the 132nd
Section of the DOCTRDm AND COVENANTS of the
L. D. S. Church.

If these parents were required

to teach their children as demanded by the
Juvenile Court in this case, the effect of such
teaching would be that these parents would have
to teach their children a religious doctrine repugnant to their own beliefs and which contravenes their faith in God.
The requirement that these parents take an
oath is a requirement that they do an act.

The

oath which the Juvenile Court would require these
28
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parents to take would require them to teach something which contravenes their faith in God.

This

amounts to requiring these parents to do an act
which contravenes their faith in God under pain
of losing custody of their children if they do not
do the act.

Such a requirement no American court

is empowered to make.

An excellent case on this

point and on the freedoms of speech and religion
handed down in recent years is WEST VIRGINIA
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION v. WALTER BARNETT,

319

u.s.

624, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943).

in the case were these:

The facts

The West Virginia legis-

lature, Sect. 1734 W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.), by
valid act approved by the Governor and thus made
law, gave the state board of education the power
and duty to prescribe courses of study in the
schools with reference to U • S. history and ci vies
and in the Constitution of the United States and
of the State of West Virginia.

In pursuance of

such statute the School Board of West Virginia
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by otherwise valid resolution required all school
children to salute the United States Flag and to
take the pledge of allegiance.

The penalty for

refusal, under grounds that such refusal was insubordination was dismissal from school.

Read-

mission was denied by statute, Section 1851 (1)
W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.) until compliance.

In

the meantime the expelled child is "unlawfully
absent" under said Section 1851, and may be proceeded against as a delinquent under Sec. 4904
(4) W. Va. Code (1941 Supp.).

His parents or

guardians are liable to prosecution under

§

1851,

supra, and i f convicted are subject to fine not
exceeding $50.00 and a jail term not exceeding
30 days under § 1851, supra.

The United States

Supreme Court looked upon the combination of
school board rulings and statutes as giving the
order of the school board the force of law.
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Board to
restrain the enforcement of these laws
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and resolutions against Jehovah's Witnesses on
the ground that members of such faith look upon
the flag as a •graven image" and are enjoined by
Exodus, Chapter 20, Verses 4 and 5 from bowing
down to such or serving the same.

Some of the

Plaintiffs' Children were expelled from school,
others threatened with expulsion and by proper
officials threatened with being sent to reformatories for criminally inclined juveniles.

The

parents were prosecuted and threatened with
prosecutions for causing delinquency.
The Board moved for dismissal of the complaint denying any infringement of constitutional
guarantees to these Plaintiffs.

The United

States District Court restrained the Board, which
Board then took a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The holding in the case was essentially that
the Board requirements amounted to a-compulsion
of students to declare a belief contrary to their
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religious convictions and such a requirement constitutes a violation of religious freedom as contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America.

The court

affirmed the judgment below.
The majority opinion written qy Justice
Jackson is, in part, as follows:
"The freedom asserted by these appellees
does not bring them into conflicts which most
frequently require intervention of the State
to determine where the rights of one end and
those of another tegin. But the refusal of
these persons to participate in the ceremony
does not interfere or deny rights of others
to do so. Nor is there any question in this
case that their behavior is peaceable and
orderly. The sole conflict is between
authority and rights of the individual.
" ••• The State asserts power to condition
access to public education on making a prescribed sign and profession and at the same
time to coerce attendance by punishing both
parent and child. The latter stand on a
right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude.
11 Here, however, we are dealing with a
compulsion of students to declare a belief.
They are not merely made acquainted with the
flag salute so that they may be informed as
to what it is or even what it means •••
" ••• The issue here is whether this slow
and easily neglected route to arouse loyalties
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constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan •••
"Here it is the State that employs a
flag as a symbol of adherence. to government
as presently organized. It required the
individual to communicate by word and sign
his acceptance of the political ideas it thus
bespeaks. Objection to this form of communication when coerced is an old one, well
known to the fr.amers of the Bill of Rights •••
"It is also noted that the compulsory
flag salute and pledge requires affirmation
of a belief and an attitude of mind... It
is now a common-place that censorship or
suppression of opinion is tolerated by our
constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action
of a kind the State is empowered to prevent
and punish ••• To sustain the compulsory
flag salute we are required to say that a
Bill of Rights which guards the individual's
right to speak his own mind, left it open
to public authorities to compel him to utter
what is not in his mind •••
"Government of limited power need not be
anemic government. Assurance that rights
are secure tends to diminish fear and
jealousy of strong government, and by making
us feel safe to live under it makes for its
better support. Without promise of a limiting bill of rights it is doubtful if our
Constitution could have mustered enough
strength to enable its ratification. To
enforce those rights today is not to choose
weak government over strong government. It
is only to adhere as a means of strength of
individual freedom of mind in preference to
officially disciplined uniformity for which
history indicates a disappointing and
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disastrous end •••
"Observation of the limitations of the
Constitution will not weaken government in
the field appropriate for its exercise •••
"There are village tyrants as well as
village Hampdens, but none who acts under
color of law is beyond reach of the Constitution."
(Speaking of the courts' duty to apply
the Bill of Rights): "We must transplant
these rights to a soil in which the laissesfaire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least to economic
affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration
of society and through expanded and strengthened government controls. These changed
conditions often deprive precedents of
reliability and cast us more than we would
choose upon our own judgment. But we act
in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.
Ye cannot, because of modest estimates of
our competence in such specialties as public
education, withhold the judgment that history
authenticates as the function of this court
when liberty is infringed .."
"Struggles to coerce uniformity of
sentiment in support of some end thought
essential to their time and country have
been waged qy many good as well as evil
men. Nationalism is a relatively recent
phenomenon but at other times and places
the ends have been racial or territorial
security, support of a dynasty or regime,
and particular plans for saving souls. As
governmental pressure to~~rd unity becomes
greater, so strife becomes more bitter as
to whose unity it shall be. Pro ba. bly no
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deeper division' of our people could proceed
from any provocation than from finding it
necessary to choose what doctrine and whose
program public educational officials shall
compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate
futility of such attempts to compel coherence
is the lesson of every such effort from the
Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a
disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition
as a means to religious and dynastic unity,
the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian
unity, down to the fast-failing efforts of
our totalitarian enemies. Those who begin
coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves
only the ananimity of the graveyard."
"It seems trite but necessary to say
that the First Amendment to our Constitution
was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding
these beginnings. There is no mysticism in
the American concept of the State or the
nature of the origin of its authority. We
set up government by consent of the governed,
and the Bill of Rights denies those in power
any legal opportunity to coerce that consent.
Authority here is controlled by public opinion, not public opinion qy authority.
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property,
to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.u
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". eoNevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that
freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate
the social organization ••• We can have intellectual individualism and rich cultural
diversities that we owe to exceptional minds
only at the price of occasional eccentricity
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so
harmless to others or to the State as those
we deal with here, the price is not too
great. But freedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedomo The test
of its substance is the right to differ as
to things that touch the heart of the
existing order.
ttif there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception,
they do not now occur to us.n
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in an
opinion in which they stated:
"Words uttered under coercion are
proof of loyalty to nothing, but self interest. Love of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds, inspired by a
fair administration of wise laws enacted qy
the people's elected representatives within
the bounds of express constitutional prohibitions. These laws must, to be consistent
with the First Amendment, permit the widest

.36
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toleration of conflicting viev~oints consistent with a society of free men."
Justice Murphy also concurred stating:
" ••• But there is before us the right
of freedom to believe, freedom to worship
one's Maker according to the dictates of
one's conscience, a right which the constitution specifically shelters. Reflection
has convinced me that as a judge I have no
loftier duty or responsibility than to uphold that spiritual freedom to its farthest
reaches.
"The right of freedom of thought and of
religion as guaranteed by the Constitution
against State action includes both the right
to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all, except in so far as
essential operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly
society--as in the case of compulsion to give
evidence in court ••••• Official compulsion
to affirm what is contrary to one's religious beliefs is the antithesis of freedom
of worship which, it is well to recall, was
achieved in this country only after what
Jefferson characterized as the 'severest contests in which I have ever been engaged' •••
"The trenchant words in the preamble
to the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom remain unanswerable: 'All attempts to
influence (the mind) by temporal punishments,
or burdens, or civil incapacitations, tend
only to beget habits of hypocricy and
meanness.' ••••
" ••• It is in that freedom and the example
of persuasion, not in force and compulsion
that the real unity of America lies."
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In dissenting Justice Frankfurter had this
to say about oath tests:
"The flag salute exercise has no kinship
whatever to the oath tests so odious in
history. For the oath test was one of the
instruments for suppressing heretical beliefs. Saluting the flag suppresses no
belief or curbs it. Children and their
parents may believe what they please, avow
their belief and practice it. It is not
even remotely suggested that the requirement for saluting the flag involves the
slightest restriction against the fullest
opportunity on the part both of the the
children and of their parents to disavow
as publicly as they choose to do so that
others attach to the gesture of salute.
All channels of affirmative free expression
are open to both children and parents. Had
we before us any act of the State putting
the slightest curbs upon such free expression, I should not lag behind any member of
this Court in striking down such an invasion
of the right of freedom of thought and freedom of speech protected by the Constitution."

Mr. Justice Hurphy in his dissent in PRINCE
v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 321 U.S. 158,

64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944) had this to
say about religious freedom:
"No chapter in human history has been
so largely written in terms of persecution
and intolerance as the one dealing with
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religious freedom. From ancient times to
the present day, the ingenuity of man has
known no limits in its ability to forge
weapons of oppression for use against those
who dare to express or practice unorthodox
religious beliefs. And the Jehovah's Witnesses are living proofs of the fact that
even in this nation, conceived as it was in
the ideals of freedom, the right to practice
religion in unconventional ways is still far
from secure~ Theirs is a militant and unpopular faith, pursued with a fanatical
zeal. They have suffered brutal beatings;
their property has been destroyed; they
have been harassed at every turn by the
resurrection and enforcement of little used
ordinances and statutes ••• To them, along
with other present-day religious minorities,
befalls the burden of testing our devotion
to the ideals and constitutional guarantees
of religious freedom. We should therefore
hesitate before approving the application
of a statute that might be used as another
instrument of oppression. Religious freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted
or prohibited in any degree without convincing proof that a legitimate interest
of the state is in grave danger .."
A point of grave importance in the instant
matter is whether a point has been reached under
the facts presented to the Juvenile Court which
would justify the State through its courts in
intervening.
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The justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States had occasion to consider this matter in a case which came to the court from this
State involving this same teaching as is now before the court.

68

s.

In MUSSER v. UTAH, 333 U.S. 95,

ct. 397, 92 L. Ed. 562 (1948), the court

sent back to the Utah Supreme Court for statutory
construction a conspiracy conviction under
Section 103-11-1 (5) Utah Code Anno., 1943, which,
the court said "so far as relevant, defines conspiracy: (5) to commit any act injurious to the
public health, the public morals or to trade or
commerce or for the perversion or obstruction of
justice or the due administration of the laws ••• '"
Mr. Justice Jackson in the opinion of the
court at page 565 L. Ed., said,
"It is obvious that this is no narrowly
drawn statute. We do not presume to give
an interpretation as to what it may include.
Standing by itself, it would seem to be warrant for conviction any act which a judge
and jury might find at the moment contrary
to his or its notion of what was good for
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health, morals, trade, commerce, justice or
order. In some states the phrase 'injurious
to public morals' would be likely to punish
acts which it would not punish in others because of the varying policies on such matters
as use of cigarettes or liquor and the permissibility of gambling. This led to the
inquiry as to whether the statute attempts
to cover so much that it effectively covers
nothing •••• "
Justice Black concurred in the result.
Justice Rutledge dissented in opinion joined
in by Justices Douglas and Murphy.

P. 567, 568 "···The Utah statute was construed. to proscribe any agreement to advocate the practice of polygamy. Thus the
line was drawn between discussion and
advocacy.
"The Constitution requires that the
statute oo lim±t·ed more narrowly. At the
very least the line must be drawn between
advocacy and incitement, and even the state's
power to punish incitement may vary with the
nature of the speech, whether persuasive or
coercive, the nature of the wrong induced,
whether violent or merely offensive to the
mores, and the degree of probability that
the substantive evil will result. See
Bridges v. California, 314 U. s. 252, 262,
263, 86 L. Ed. 192,202,203, 62 S. Ct. 190,
159 ALR 1346.
"It is axiomatic that a democratic state
may not deny its citizens the right to criticise existing laws and urge that they be
changed. And yet, in order to succeed in an
41
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effort to legalize polygamy it is obviously
necessary to convince a substantial number of
people that such conduct is desirable. But
conviction that the practice is desirable
has a natural tendency to induce the practice
itself. Thus, depending on where the circular reasoning is started, the advocacy of
polygamy may either be unlawful as inducing
a violation of the law, or be constitutionally protected as essential to the proper
functioning of the democratic process.
"In the abstract the problem could be
solved in various ways. At one extreme it
could be said that society can best protect
itself by prohibiting the substantive evil
and relying on a completely free interchange
of ideas as the best safeguard against demoralizing propaganda. Or we might permit
advocacy of lawbreaking, but only so long as
the advocacy fall short of incitement. But
the other extreme position, that the state
may prevent any conduct which induces people
to violate the law, or any advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the
First Amendment. At the very least, as we
have indicated, under the clear-and-presentdanger rule, the second alternative stated
marks the limit of the state's power as restricted by the Amendment. 11
Justice Rutledge cited in note 7 the following exerpt from a letter by Thomas Jefferson to
Elijah Boardman:
"We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasonings of some, if others are
left free to demonstrate their errors and
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especially when the law stands ready to punish the first criminal act produced by false
reasonings; these are safer corrections than
the conscience of a judge."
And in note 8 he quotes from Mr. Justice
Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. Calfiornia,
274 U.S.357, at 376, 71 L. Ed. at 1095, 47 S. Ct.
641, at follows:
"But even advocacy of violation, however
reprehensible morally, is not a justification
for denying free speech where the advocacy
falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on.n
There can be no "clear and present dangern
here.

These children are not ready for marriage.

Even the oldest son nowhere indicates a present intention of marrying and certainly the court makes
no finding to the effect that he immediately intends
marriage.

These children are not being told to vio-

late the law; they are being taught what their parents believe to be the word of God handed down in
Revelation through the hand of His Prophet Joseph
Smith.

The clear-and-present-danger rule implies
43
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that the danger must be vastly more imminent than
that shown by the facts before the Juvenile Court.
What it means with reference to the curtailment of
speech in the United States may be seen by referring
to a dissenting opinion in

ABRA~~

v. UNITED STATES,

250 U.S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17 (1919).

The Supreme

Court affirmed a conviction under the Espionage
Act.

Mr. Justice Holmes wrote an eloquent dissent

with reference to free speech.

It is, in part, as

follows:
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me to be perfectly logical. If
you have no doubt of your premise or your
power, and want a certain result with all your
heart, you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that
you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that
you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or
premises. But when men have realized that
time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct, that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that
the best test of truth is the povrer of the
thought to get itself accept~d in the com-
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petition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can
be carried out. That, at any rate, is the
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every
y~ar, i f not every day, we have to wager our
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is
part of our system, I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expression of opinions that we loath and
believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of law
that an immediate check is required to save
the country •••• Only the emergency that makes
it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making
any exception to the sweeping co~mand, 'Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
of speech' ••• I regret that I cannot put into
more impressive words my belief that in their
conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the
Constitution of the United States."
The criminal statutes of this State and the
powers of its courts to enforce them are quite
sufficient to handle the matter of violations of
the criminal law when they occur.

In the case

before the court it would seem that the Juvenile
Court of Washington County is seeking to reach
out and punish these parents

qy

taking away the

custody of their children for a possible future
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

violation of the law by those children which violation might well never occur.
the

Juveni~e

In the same sense,

Court would be punishing these chil-

dren by depriving them of the loving care of their
natural parents for a possible future violation
of the law by these children which violation might
well never occur.

To say that the clear-and-pre-

sent-danger rule can be applied to clothe the
Juvenile Court with such overriding power, is to
say that the inherent right of an American citizen to
have a. particular faith in God and to teach that
faith to his children in his Qwn home exists only
so long as his concept of God's Word agrees with
the concept of a particular judge as to what God's
Word is.

To say such and to enforce that idea

by the power of the courts is to do so in vio-

lation of both the Constitution of Utah and the
Constitution of The United States of America.
Point 2.

The Decree

,:~nd

Judgment operates

to take the custody of children from their natural
4€->
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parents without due process of law, the court having no jurisdiction to enter the Decree and Judgment which it has entered, all of which constitutes
the taking of life, liberty or property without
due process of law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the The United States
of America and Section 7 of Article I of the
Constitution of Utah.
The right of parents to the care and custody
of their children is a right protected from infringement by the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution of The United States
of America set out in the argument under Point 1
above and by Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah which reads as follows:
"No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of
law."
A parent is entitled to the services and
earnings of his minor child.

When the child is

taken from its parent by a decree of a court act47
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ing in excess of its jurisdiction the parent is
deprived of property without due process of law.
Mr. Vernier in

4 AMERICAN FAMILY LAW ~ 232,

page 20 says:
"The father is clearly entitled to the
services and e~rnings of the child under the
common law. There is some dispute in the
cases as to whether the surviving mother is
so entitled, but the weight of authority and
better opinion confers the right upon her.
As indicated above, the cases often fallaciously base the rule on a so-called reciprocal
duty of support in the parent. A more logical
basis of the rule is that the parents are
entitled to the child's earnings in order to
better enable them to control him."
There have been statutory variations made on
the rule, and these are pointed out by Mr. Vernier;
however, the right of the parents to the earnings
of their minor children, with certain protections
for the children, is well established in all jurisdictions.
This question was dealt with in BROOKS v.

DeWITT, Tex. Civ. App., 178 S.W. (2d) 718, (1944),
wherein the court spoke of due process and the
property right of parents over their children,
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as follows:
"While the State undoubtedly has an interest in the status of infants within its
jurisdiction and may prescribe by statute
reasonable tests and standards from which it
may be determined whether or not parents by
neglect or unsocial conduct have in fact lost
their rights in and to a child, it is also
true that the rights of parents over their
children are in the nature of property rights
and protected by the due process clause of the
Four+.eenth Amendment · of the United States
Constitution.n
The issue was considered by the California
Court in ODELL v. LUTZ, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 104, 177
P (2d) 628, (1947), where the court also went into
the question of the right of the state to interfere
with parental direction of children.

The court

said:
"Although the rights of parenthood are
not absolute, but subject to the superior right
of the state to intervene and protect the child
against abuse of parental authority, the state
may not constitutionally interfere with the
natural liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children ••• The supremacy
of the mother and father in their own home in
regard to the control of their children is
generally recognized. 'It is said that the
natural rights of a father ••• are greater than
those which any guardian can have ••• The legal
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obligations of parenthood include the duties
of support, of care and protection, and of
education. As compensation therefor, the
laV-' recognizes certain rights in the parent •••
So fundamental are the rights of parenthood
that infringements thereof have been held to
constitute an encroachment on the personal
liberty of the parent forbidden by the Constitution ••• • 39 Am. Jur. 593, 594."
This right of parents to the care and custody
of their minor children is a natural right which
far transcends our concept of property.

It is

such a right that it will be interfered with by
courts only for the gravest reasons,
which

reason~do

not exist here.

The extent of

this right and the power and position of the state
with reference to its minor children will be more
thoroughly dealt with in the discussion immediately
hereinafter following under Point 3 with reference to
the doctrine of parens patriae.
Point 3.

Section 55-10-35, Utah Code Anno-

tated, 1953, under which the Juvenile Court in
subparagraph 5 of its Decree and Judgment purports
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to act in stating that the execution of its judgment shall not be stayed pending an appeal, is unconstitutional if it can be invoked in a case like
the case at bar in that, it is a violation of due
process of law and an overextension of the doctrine
of parens patriae, under which doctrine Juvenile
Court statutes must be justified.
In the taking of custody of children from
their parents the state takes away the liberty
of both the parent and the child.

Such action is

quite as serious as any criminal matter.

The pro-

tections afforded those deprived of such liberty
in order to meet due process requirements should
be no less than those afforded the accused criminal.
There are many instances in the law when bail is
granted to persons convicted of crimes in the lower
courts pending appeal of their convictions.
Section 55-10-35 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
is as follows:
"Stay pending appeal -- • An appeal,
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with or without bail, in the case of a child,
shall not suspend the order of the juvenile
court, nor shall it discharge the child from
the custody of the juvenile court, or of the
person, institution, or agency to whose care
such child shall have been committed, unless
the juvenile court shall so order."
Such a statute could never have been intended
by the legislature to have been invoked in a case
like the case at bar.

By its very wording, it im-

plies that it is meant to apply only in a case in
which bail might be appropriate.

When anyone thinks

of bail, he thinks of a criminal violation.

These

children have not been accused of any criminal
violation; they were not taken into custody for
anything which they may have done.

The setting

of bail in a case such as this would have been manifestly absurd.

Even if it be held that the section

was intended to apply only when a minor has been
apprehended for, accused of, and tried by the juvenile court for an act which, had it been done by an
adult, would be denominated a bailable offense,
it is doubtful if the statute is constitutional
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since the power of the juvenile court to refuse
the stay depends upon nothing, so far as the
statute is concerned.

The court seems to be given

unlimited discretion, and the statute would almost
permit the juvenile court to refuse the stay without reason, regardless of the circumstances of the
case or the offense involved.

Such authority would

seem to go too far, especially in juvenile matters,
since the duty of juvenile courts under the doctrine of parens patriae is to administer justice
tempered with mercy.
Irreparable harm can be done children by taking them forcibly from their mother's protecting
arms, even for one day.

It is a matter of common

knowledge that these children were forcibly taken
from their mother.

Whether irreparable harm was

done to these children by such act only the passage
of time will disclose.

Perhaps time will heal

those wounds as it has healed many others, but a
youthful im0ression of justice or injustice is
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very seldom changed, except to be deepened, by time.
When should a juvenile judge grant a stay?
The statute certainly doesn't say.

The juvenile

judge is given no standard to go by, certainly not
a standard set by the statute.
The Juvenile Judge of Washington County, Utah
in this case in Subparagraph 5 of his Decree and
Judgment decided that "the judgment shall not be
stayed in the event of any appeal to the Supreme
Court of Utah."

Why did the court see fit to in-

clude this statement in its Decree and Judgment?
The matter was heard on March 20, 1954.
decision was rendered on May 11, 1954.

The
Conditions

were so bad in this home that the court had already
left the children there almost two months before
making his decision and was willing to let them
remain there indefinitely if the parents would only
take and subscribe and file the oath which the court
prescribed.

Could those conditions have been so

bad that upon the parents• failure to agree to the
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1

conditions set by the court these children would
have been greatly harmed by leaving them with their
mother pending an appeal to this court from a decision which seems to have been one of first impression?
But the statute does not require the court to exercise any discretion.

The statute can only be cons-

titutional under the doctrine of parens patriae
if it implies that the court must exercise reason-

able discretion.

If the statute does so imply,

there is no evidence that any reasonable discretion
was used by the court in this case.
The

right of the courts to interfere with

parental upbringing of their children, particularly with reference to their religious instruction,
is certainly sufficiently nebulous as to appraise
any court that in so interfering he may well be
mistaken in his concept of his authority.

The

case of DENTON v. JAMES, 107 Kan. 729, 193 Pac.

307, 12 A.L.R. 1146 (1920) goes into the matter
of the power of the state in this regard in a
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manner well-suited to appraise anyone of the need
for great discretion in these matters.

In that

opinion the Kansas court reasoned, in part, as follows:
" ••• Any court will say that the criterion of
parental right to custody of a child is welfare
of the child. The criterion, however, is not
always judiciously applied. Sometimes it is
declared that the rearing of children is a
function which the state delegates to parents,
and which it may resume at will, for its welfare,
through the welfare of the child. The rearing
of children is not in fact a function delegated
by the state to the citizen, any more than the
begetting of children is a delegated state
function, and the theory of government recognized by the declaration is responsible for
absolutism in its most tyrannical form. The
theory is expressly repudiated by the first
two sections of the Bill of Rights of this
state:
11.
All men are possessed of equal and
inalienable natural rights, among which are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
1 2.
All political power is inherent in
the people, and all free governments are founded
on their authority, and are instituted for their
equal protection and benefit •••• •
"Gen. Stato 1915 S~ 105, 106.
"Man has no higher right or interest or
happiness than that for which the words 'family'
and 'home' stand. Very often it is said, with
a touch of derision, that a child is not a
chattel,anda parent has no property in his child
giving him right to custody, which is very true.
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The interest which a parent has in the nurture
of his mm offspring, and in nearness to
them for that purpose, lies in a different
plane from that occupied by property; it
transcends property. On the child's side,
it has no higher welfare than to be raised
by their parents, and free government is
instituted for the protection and benefit of
parenthood as one of the natural rights which
the citizen possesses. Acting on these principles, this court holds that welfare of a
child is best subserved by leaving it with
its natural guardian until it is demonstrated
that the parent is unfit to discharge the
duties which are correlative to his right.
Then, and not until then, does his right yield,
The latest decision on the subject was made
in March of this year, in the case of Crews
v. Sheldon, 106 Kan. 438, 186 Pac. 498. Previous decisions are collated in the opinion.
" ••• Section 7 of the Bill of Rights of
this state reads as follows:
'The right to worship God according to
the dictates of conscience shall never he
infringed, nor shall any person be compelled
to attend or support any form of worship;
nor shall any control of or interference with
the rights of conscience be permitted, nor
any preference be given by law to any religious
establishmeHt or mode of worship ••• ' Gen.
Stat. 1915 s 111.
"In the case of Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall.
679, 20 L. Ed. 666, the Supreme Court of the
United States enunciated a principle which
is applicable here, as it was in the controversy under decision:
1 In this country the full and free right
to entertain any religious belief, to practice
any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine \vhich does not violate the
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laws of morality and property, and which does
not infringe personal rights, is conceded to
all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed
to the support of no dogma ••• • 13 Wall. 728,
20 L. Ed. 666.
"Aside from limitations of the general
character indicated, the courts have no authority over that part of a child's training which
consists in religious discipline, and in a dispute relating to custody, religious views afford
no ground for depriving a parent of custody who
is otherwise qualifiedon
Another case which throws light upon this subject, as well as upon the matter considered under
Point 4, infra, is a case well-seasoned with age,
TURNER, 55 Ill.

280, 8 Am.

THE PEOPLE ex rel

Ve

Rep. 645 (1820).

This case involved committment

of a 16 year old boy to the Reform School of the
City of Chicago as one who was ndestitute of proper
parental care, and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice".
unconstitutional.

The court held the statute

It said:

"What is proper parental care? The best
and kindest parents v.rould differ, in the attempt
to solve the question. No two scarcely agree;
and when we consider the watchful supervision,
which is so unremitting over the domestic affairs
of others, the conclusion is forced upon us,
that there is not a child in the land who could
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not be proved, by two or more witnesses, to
be in this sad condition •••• In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civil
life, we should not forget the rights which
inhere both in parents and children. The
principle of the absorption of the child in,
and its complete submission to the despotism
of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in the
modern civilized world.
''The parent has the right to the care,
custody and assistance of his child. The
duty to maintain and protect it, is a principle of natural law. He may even justify
an assault and battery, in the defense of
his children, and uphold them in their law
suits. Thus the law recognizes the power of
parental affection, and excuses acts, which,
in the absence of such a relation would be
punished. Another branch of parental duty,
strongly inculcated by writers on natural
law, is the education of children. To aid
in the performance of these duties, and enforce obedience, parents have authority over
them. The municipal law should not disturb
this relation, except for the strongest
reasons. The ease with which it can be disrupted under the laws in question; the
slight evidence required, and the informal
mode of procedure, make them conflict with
the natural right of the parent. Before
any abridgment of the right, gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part
of the parent, should be clearly proved.
This power is an emanation from God, and
every attempt to infringe upon it, except
from dire necessity, should be resisted in
all well governed States. 'In this country,
the hope of the child, in respect to its
education and future advancement, is mainly
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dependent upon the father; for this he
struggles and toils through life; the desire
of its accomplishment operating as one of
the most powerfUl incentives to industry and
thrift. The violent abruption of this relation would not only tend to wither these
motives to action, but necessarily, in time,
alienate the father's natural affections. "'
A very well reasoned case by the Colorado
court deals with the position of the state as
regards interference with the relationship of
children to their natural parents.

In NELSON v.

MITCHELL, 48 Colo. 454, 111 Pac. 21, 30 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 507 (1910), the father of the minor child
having died, her divorced mother, who had remarried, sought custody by habeas corpus from
the paternal grandparents of her daughter.

In

awarding the custody to the mother, the court
considered the general problems and legal
theories involved as follows:
"··· But as governments should never
interfere with the natural rights of man,
except only when it is essential for the
good of society, the state recognizes and
enforces the right which nature gives to
parents to the custody of their mm chil-
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dren, and only supervenes with its sovereign
power when the necessities of the case require
it. The experience of man has demonstrated
that the best development of a young life is
within the sacred precincts of a home, the
members of which are bound together by ties
entwined through 1 bone of their bone and
flesh of their flesh'; that it is such homes
and under such influences that the sweetest,
purest, noblest, and most attractive qualities
of human nature, so essential to good citizenship, are best nurtured and grow to wholesome
fruition; that, when a state is based and
builqed upon such homes, it is strong in
patriotism, courage, and all the elements of
the best civilization. Accordingly these
recurring facts in the experience of man resulted in a presumption establishing prima
facie that parents are in every way qualified
to have the care, custody, and control of
their own offspring, and that their welfare
and interests are best subserved under such
control. Thus, by natural law, by common
law, and, likewise, the statutes of this
state, the natural parents are entitled to
the custody of their minor children, except
when they are unsuitable persons to be intrusted with their care, control, and education, or when some exceptional circumstances appear which render such custody inimicable to the best interests of the child.
"In Re Neff, 20 Wash. 652, 56 Pac. 383,
384, it is said: The father 'has the natural
and legal right to the custody and control of
the children, unless so completely unfit from
duties that the welfare of the children themselves imperatively demanded another disposition of their custody.' In Miller v.
Wallace, 76 Ga. 479, 486, 2 Am. St. Rep. 48,
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it is said, 'Prima facie, the right of custody
of an infant is in the father; and when this
right is resisted, upon the ground of his unfitness for the trust, or other cause, a
proper regard to the sanctity of the parental
relation will require that the objection be
sustained by clear and satisfactory proofs.'
A clear and strong case 'must be made to sustain an objection to the father's right.'
And in McKercher v. Green, supra, the doctrine is announced that, save in exceptional
cases, where it is clear the welfare of the
child demands otherwise, the parents' right
to the custody is paramount, and should be
recognized. In United States v. Green,
3 Mason 482, 485, Fed. Cas. No. 15256, the
court, speaking through Justice Story, after
declaring that, in a general sense, the right
of the father to have the custody of his infant child is certain, continues: 'But this
is not on account of any absolute right of
the father, but for the benefit of the infant, the law presumes it to be for its interest to be under the nurture and care of
his natural protector, both for maintenance
and e,duca tion. 1 The rule announced in 29
Cyc • Law & Proc. p. 1603, is that 1 the existence of circumstances which would deprive
the parent of the right to custody of the
child, such as unfitness, inability to care
for it, or relinquishment of the parental
right of custody, will not be presumed, but
must be proved by the person opposing the
parent's right.' It is also there announced
that the place selected by a parent for the
care and support of his children is presumed
suitable, and a person claiming otherwise has
the burden of proof.
'~e are firmly of the opinion that in
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1·:

all cases of this character the presumption
is that the parents are fit and suitable
persons to be intrusted with the care of
their minor children, and the interests and
welfare of such children are best subserved
when under such care and control; that such
presumption is like unto the presumption of
innocence in a criminal case,--ever present,
throughout the controversy, until overcome
by the most solid and substantial reasons,
established by plain and certain proofs.
Indeed, this presumption is essential to the
maintenance of society, for without it man
would be denaturalized, the ties of family
broken, the instincts of humanity stifled,
and one of the strongest incentives to the
propagation and continuance of the human
race destroyed... In such proceedings the
power to make orders touching the care and
custody of minor children must be held to be
limited to the conditions and circumstances
existing at the time such orders are made.
The court cannot then anticipate what may
possibly thereafter happen, and provide for
such future contingencies."
The Wisconsin court considered this problem,
as well as the important question of due process,

in LOCHER v. VENUS, 177 Wis. 588, 188 N.W. 613,
24 A.L.R. 403 (1922).

The court in considering

the taking of children from their parents by the
state, touched upon the most serious nature of
such action, as follows:
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"The unit of the state is the individual,
its foundation the family. To protect the
unit in his constitutionally guaranteed right
to form and preserve the family is one of the
basic principles for which organized government is established. Cooley, Torts, 3 d.
ed. p. 27.
Th~t natural parenthood implies both
substantial responsibilities and gives substantial rights needs no discussion. That
wilful neglect to perform the one may properly result in the forfeiture of the other is
also not open to debate, and not here for
consideration.
"A natural affection between the parents
and offspring, though it may be nought but a
refined animal instinct and stronger from the
parent down than from the child up, has always been recognized as an inherent, natural
right, for the protection of which, just as
much as for the protection of the rights of
the individual to life, liberty, and pursuit
of happiness, our government is formed. We
trust that it will never become the established doctrine that the state shall say to
the parents, and particularly to the mother,
--she who doth travail, and in great pain
bring forth her child, and after labor doth
rejoice that the child is born,--that there
is but a mere privilege, and not a right, to
subsequent affection, comfort, and pride of
and in such child •••
11 If a man's money shall not be legally
taken away from him save by due process of
law, much less shall his child. We do not
deem it necessary to base this decision upon
or dwell at any length upon such possible
sordid, because material, grounds for our
conclusion, but rest it upon the natural
11

r
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right of parenthood, a far finer and higher
quality, and for that reason more sacredly
to be upheld.
"The normal man and woman who have exercised their inherent right to form the family
relationship, and have brought children into
this world, and who have not by wilful omission or commission on their part renounced
that relationship, cannot and ought not to
have such relationship destroyed, even by
attempted action in the name of the state,
save and except through due process of law."
Mr. Justice McReynolds in PIERCE

v.

SOCIETY

OF SISTERS, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct.571, 69 L. Ed.
1070 (1925), a case involving private v.

pub~ic

schools, said,
"The child is not the mere creature of
the state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."
It could be assumed, no doubt, that preparation for additional obligations might well include
preparing him to meet what his parents conscientiously
believe to be man's obligations to His Maker.
Even when the matter of deprivation is before
the court the doctrine of parens patriae is a
li.mi ted one •
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CLARK v. LYON, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N. W. 472,
20 L.RoA. (N.S.) 171 (1908), was a case involving
the right of a divorced father to custody of his
children after his ex-wife's death.

The court in

speaking of the position of the state with reference to minors said,
"The statute does not make the judges
the guardians of all children in the state,
with power to take them from their parents,
so long as the latter discharge their duties
to the best of their ability, and give them
to strangers because such strangers may be
better able to provide what is already well
provided. If that were the law, it would
soon be changed by revolution, if necessary."
The Washington court goes into the question
of how far a state can go in the matter of taking
children from their parents in LOVELL v. HOUSE
OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD, 9 Wash. 419, 37 Pac. 660.

A widowed mother left her daughter with the defendant orphanage.
~dopted

Later the mother's parents

the child, demanded her from the defendants

ind brought a habeas corpus action to obtain custody.
rhe court held that the writ should issueo
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In considering the question as to when children
should be taken from their parents, the court went
generally into the problem.

The opinion by Chief

Justice Dunbar is, in part, as follows:
" ••• While it is true that the welfare
of the child should be the first consideration
of the court, yet the right of the parent is
not to be disregarded; and it is a grave responsibility to deprive parents of the care,
control, custody, and education of their children because they do not came up to the standard of perfection that we have established for
our own action in that respect. There is
scarcely a day but that children may be seen,
who, in the ordinary estimation are neglected,
and of whom the popular verdict would declare
that they would be better off, and stand a
better chance of becoming useful members of
society, if they were removed from the pernicious influence of their parents. Yet it
would not do for that reason to interfere
with the domestic relations, or to set up o,IT
particular standard for the guidance of families in general. There is such a diversity
of religious and social opinion, and of social
standing and of intellectual development and
of moral responsibility, in society at large,
that courts must exercise great charity and
forbea~nce for the opinions, methods, and
practices of all different classes of society;
and a case should be made out which is sufficiently extravagant and singular and wrong
to meet the condemnation of all decent and
law-abiding people, without regard to religious
belief or social standing, before a parent
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should be deprived of the comfort or custody
of a child. It is doubtful that the appellant
Mrs. Lovell has n'ot been the most exemplary
mother; that the care of her children has not
been of that kind which would commend itself
to many mothers. That she is a passionate
woman, with an uncontrollable temper - coarse,
vulgar, and pugnacious - is evident from the
record. But if every coarse, vulgar, and
passionate woman were deprived of the custody
of her children, our orphan asylums would be
filled to overflowing; and i f every man who
is given to brutalizing himself by the excessive use of intoxicants, and by other debasing
habito, were to be deprived of the custody of
his children, the said institutions would be
found altogether inadequate. Even immorality of
the mother is not always a sufficient reason
for depriving her of the custody of her child.
It is the universal holding of the courts, and
in many states is made a provision of the statute, that the mother of an illegitimate child,
in the absence of special reasons, is entitled
to its custcdy, and of course the fact of illegitimacy is proof of the mother's immorality.
The maternal instinct can generally be relied
upon to protect the child far better than
strangers, who act simply from a cold and unsympathetic feeling of duty to society. Of
course, when it becomes apparent that nature's
appeal to the parental heart meets with no
response, and a parent has become so brutalized
and lost to the promptings of nature that she
is willing to sacrifice either the physical or
moral well-being of her children to the gratification of her own debased propensities or
vicious habits, it becomes the imperative duty
of the court to reach forth its hand for the
protection of the children. But, as we have
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before said, we do not think the result in
this case shows a necessity for judicial
interference; and, even though it may appear
that three years ago the mother was not a
competent person to maintain control of this
child, the difficulties then alleged to exist
have now passed away. Hence, the necessity
of separating the mother and child has ceased
to exist."
Another case of note on this point is BRYANT
Vo BROW~,

151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 60 A.L.R.

1325 (1928).

The court upheld a committment of

a minor to the industrial school but in doing so
announced the general rule with reference to the
taking of children from their parents, as follm.rs
(p. 1331 A. Lo R.)
"As long as parents properly exercise
their duty, under their natural rights, to
rear, educate, and control their children,
their right t.o do so may not be interfered \·Ji th
solely because some other person or some other
institution might be deemed better suited for
that purpose. The children of the poor cannot be taken from them, and awarded to the
rich or to some rich and powerful institution,
merely because such person or such institution
might, in the judgment of the court, do a
better part by the child than the natural
parents. But where the parents fail to perform their natural duty to so rear and educate
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the child as to make it a useful, intelligent,
and moral being, but permit it to go unrestrained
and to qecome vicious in its habits and practices, and a menace to the rest of society,
the state as parens patriae of all children,
may assert its power and apply the curative,
so as to prevent injury to the child and to
society by the negligent and wrongful conduct
of the parents in failing to exercise the
proper control and restraint over the child
in its tendencies."
Anderson, J., dissenting to the decision (p.

1341, A.L.R.) states:
\fuat has become of one of the fundamental
principles of our government, -that the people
who are the least governed are the best governed?
When the state undertakes to do too much for
the people, the result is they do too little
for themselves - they rely on the state. By
the statute here involved the state enters
the precinct of the home, and says to the
parents of the child, "Although you are doing
the best you can to rear your child properly,
you are making a failure of it, and the state
is going to tmdertake the job." If the state
~q.n go that far, -vrhy not go a step further, and
say by law that only those who are fit according to a moral, intellectual, and property
standard fixed by the state, shall marry and
bring children into the world?
"The companionship and services of their
children are a valuable property right given
their parents both by the laws of nature and
by the laws of the state. Like any other property right, it cannot be arbitrarily taken
away from them by the state. To take such a
11
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property right away, the state must show the
parents have done something to forfeit it.
Othenrise they would be deprived of their
right in violation of the due process provisions of the federal and state Constitutions."
The doctrine of parens patriae is not one giving juvenile courts unlimited powers. Neither do
the states have unlimited powers under this doctrine.
Section 55-10-35, Utah Code Anno,, 1953, far exceeds
the scope of the doctrine i f it confers on the
juvenile courts the indiscretionate power which it
seems to confer by its \vords.

If the court can

imply the discretionate restriction into the section,
then certainly the Juvenile Court of Washington
County, Utah exceeded the bounds of discretion given
it under the doctrine of parens patriae in invoking this power under the facts of the case at bar.
Point 4.

Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Anno-

ta ted, 195 3, under \-Thich the Juvenile Court in 1.
of its Conclusions of Law finds the children
"neglected children" is unconstitutional, in that
it is vague and uncertain.
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Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 is,
as follows:
" ••• The words 'neglected child' include:
"A child who is abandoned by his parent,
guardian or custodian.
ttA child who lacks proper parental care
by reason of fault or habits of the parent,
guardian or custodian.
"A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide proper
or necessary subsistence, education, medical
or surgical care or other care necessary for
his health, morals or well-being.
"A child whose parent, guardian or custodian neglects or refuses to provide the snecial care made necessary by his mental condition.
"A child who is found in a disreputable
place or who associates with vagrant, vicious
or immoral persons.
"A child who engages in an occupation
or is in a situation dangerous to life or
limb or injurious to the health or morals
of himself or others."
What is the meaning of the words na child
whose parent ••• neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary ••• other care necessary for
his health, morals or vrell-being,"? Finding of
Fact 17, 18 and 19 and Conclusions of Law 1 and
2 taken in conjunction with Finding of Fact 16,
72
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to wit, "that there was no evidence that any of
the children were destitute and without proper
sustenance, clothing or medical care," indicate
that the court either contradicted Finding of
Fact 16 in Finding of Fact 18 where it said the
parents "failed and neglected to provide for said
children the proper maintenance, care, training
and education contemplated and required by both
law and morals", or it has placed its deprivation
of custody solely on the grounds that these parents
are raising these children in an immoral environment or in such a way as to make the children grow
up to be immoral.
What is the standard of immorality used by
the court? From the conditions set by the Decree
and Judgment and the oath prescribed by the court
it might well appear that the judgment of immorality comes from the fact that it appears that these
children are so situated that they are exposed
to the religious philosophy which their parents
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believe to be the Word of God.

Such a religious

philosophy has been held by the Federal District
Court for the District of Utah not to be immoral.
That philosophy is found in Section 132 of DOCTRINE
and COVENANTS of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, all the material in which book
is looked upon by over

1,ooo,ooo

people through-

out the world, the majority being in tre United
States, as being the Word of God.

Certainly the

court is not saying that any part of the Word of
God is immoral.

The rest of the Philosophy, in

view especially of the emphasis placed upon it
in the questions propounded to the witnesses at
the hearing with reference to it, may be said to
be found in Truth Magazine.

The editorial from

that magazine quoted by Judge Symes in the case
of UNITED STATES v. BARLOW, 56 F. Supp. 795,

(1944), is quoted in this argument under Point 1,
supra.

It was looked upon by that court as

typical of what might be found on the subject in
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that publication.
The Barlow case on the question of morals
here involved is important enough to deserve a
detailed presentation.
In tbat case the court was dealing with an
indictment under the mailing laws which charged
that

11

TRUTH 11 magazine was "obscene, lewd, or

lascivious" and "of an indecent charactern.

This

was felt to be a necessary incident of certain
editorials in that publication which "simply advocated the restoration of •celestial or plural
marriage', stating that the Lord has revealed the
principle thereof." The court, Judge Symes sitting,
quoted the editorial set out hereinabove and said
on page 796:
"A careful reading of the editorial discloses no obscene or filthy word of expression
of lewd suggestion is used or contained therein.
It is restrained and nothing more than an argument in favor of a practice that for many
years was a tenet of the Mormon Church, until
abolished as a condition of Utah to Statehood.
I cannot see how any word or sentence in these
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editorials submitted to the court can be denominated as lascivious, or of a nature to excite
erotic feelings or thoughts in the mind of
the ordinary reader, or as tending to deprave
public morals, or lead to impure purposes or
practices."
On page 797 the court said,
"A reading of the publication here involved forces us to the same conclusion.
As stated, it is nothing more than advocacy
of a certain practice that was once part of
the religion of the Mormon Church, and which
this group of defendants still advocates.
There is nothing in it that comes within the
language of the Swearingen case, or which
tends to corrupt and debauch the minds and
morals of those in whose hands it might fall.
"The court takes judicial notice that
the Morman Church for many years advocated
polygamy, and in doing so used the mails to
disseminate its literature, advocating
'celestial or plural marriages'. Such a use
of the mails has continued for many years
without molestation, and has never before been
questioned. In the interpretation of a doubtful and ambiguous statute - a uniform administrative practice by the authorities in respect thereto over a considerable period of
time carries weight with the court, especially
where, as here, thousands of good citizens
sincerely and honestly believe in it as part
of their religion.
"It was quite natural that when the Congress forbade plural marriages and the church
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agreed to submit to those laws many of the
followers of the Morman faith felt they could
not conscientiously and sincerely change their
beliefs in the face of what they considered
the direct command of God to the contrary.
"In conclusion, it might be said that the
natural reaction to reading a publication
setting forth that polygamy is essential to
salvation is one of repugnance and does not
tend to increase sexual desire or impure
thoughts. We also bear in mind that one
cannot pick up a national magazine, or go to
the theatre or movie without being confronted
with illustrations and advertisements that
tend more to incite sexual desire than do any
of the publications in this magazine that
have been called to our attention. In fact
sex excitement is a selling point of innumerable publications and advertisements that pass
without comment or prosecution."
It is to be emphasized that the court said on
page 797 "There is nothing in it that comes within
the language of the Swearingen case, or which tends
to corrupt and debauch the minds and morals of those
in whose hands it might fall."
Judge Symes apparently did not feel that this
religious philosophy was immoral or that it would
corrupt the mind and morals of anyone, but the
Juvenile Judge of Washington County, Utah appar77
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ently felt otherwise.

A third person might have

yet another opinion, and so a fourth, and so on
ad infinitum.

A hundred different people are quite

likely to have a hundred different conceptions of
what is moral and what is immorale
The section of the statute in question gives
no statutory definition of the term involved.

In

so failing, it might well be held to have left the
question of what is proper or necessary moral care
completely up to the juvenile judge.

This would

seem to be an improper delegation of legislative
power.

If it is not improper delegation then the

court should look to the cases for guidance.

Al-

though it may not be binding authority on the Utah
courts, the opinion of the Federal District Judge,
District of Utah, in a matter in which the issue
was involved would surely be looked upon as most
highly persuasive authority, especially so in view
of the fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States dismissed, without opinion, an appeal by
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The United States from the Barlow decision of the
Federal District Court, District of Utah, at 323

u.s.

805, 65 s.ct. 25, L. Ed.

642.

In the case of MUSSER v. UTAH in the United
States Supreme Court, set out hereinabove in the
argument under Point 1 the opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson on the use of the term "injurious to public
morals" in the statute involved indicates the
Justice's distrust of such broad wording without
limitation or definition.
In the rehearing of this case in the Supreme
Court of Utah in STATE v. MUSSER, - Utah - , 223
P. (2d) 193 (1950), the court held the statute
"void for vagueness and uncertainty under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."

Mr. Justice Wade in the opinion of the court at
page 194 reasoned as follows:
"The argument before this court has
developed no reason why we should believe
that the legislature intended, in using this
language, that it should be limited to a
meaning less broad than the words therein used
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would indicate in their ordinary sense. No
language in this or any other statute of
this state or other law thereof or any historical fact or surrounding circumstance connected with the enactment of this statute
has been pointed to as indicating that the
legislature intended any limitation thereon
other than that expressed on the face
of the words used. We are therefore unable
to place a construction on these words which
limits their meaning beyond the general
meaning. The conviction of the defendants
thereunder cannot be upheld."
The same indictment given the words in that
case should be applied to the words called into
question herein in Section 55-10-6, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.

The words "necessary for his

health, morals or well-beingtt are certainly
susceptible to a multiplicity of interpretations
limited only qy the number of people called upon
to interpret them.
Point 5.

The Findings of Fact 14, 17, 18,

and 19 are not supported by the evidence, and
said Findings of Fact being essential to the
Conclusions of Law entered by the court, said
Conclusions of Law are, therefore, not based upon
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the evidence before the court, and the Judgment
and Decree based upon said Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is, therefore, erroneous.
Finding of Fact 14 is as follows:
"That said parents, Leonard and Vera
Johnson Black, have at no time counseled
or advised any of their children to abide
by the laws of Utah regarding polygamy, but
on the contrary by their (the Parents') own
conduct and example in living polygamy and
by associating themselves with a religious
group whose members practice and advocate
polygamy have encouraged their children to
become polygamis~when they become of marriageable age."
This finding of fact seems to be at variance
with the testimony produced at the hearing.
Mr. Black testified, on page 38 of the transcript of testimony, under questioning by the court
as follows:
"Question - Did you encourage your daughters
to make the marriages they did?
Answer-

No, sir."

On page 43 under questioning by Mr. Nelson,
as follows:
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"Question - Have you generally and has
your wife, tried to teach
your children the necessity
of obedience to the law?
Answer -

Yes. We have been strict on
obeying the laws, stealing
and so forth."

On pages 44 and 45 in answer to a question by
the court to this effect:

" ••• I am very interested

in knowing whether it would be your intention to

encourage your children to comply with the laws of
Utah regarding plural marriage and unlawful cohabitation or if you are going to leave it up to the
children when they become of the age of consent
as you say.

What is it your intention to do?",

Mr. Black answered, "I can tell them the results
and facts, not to be law-breakers."
The mother of the children under direct
questioning by Mr. Nelson on page 61 answered the
question, nWhat do you expect to teach your children
Mrs. Black?", as follows:

"I expect to teach them

to be upright, good citizens as far as my knowledge
goes."
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And further on page 61 of the transcript:
"Question - Well, then I will put it this
way. If you feel that the
law doe~ not adhere to your
concept of what it should be,
that you are free to breach
that law and to teach your
children to do so?
Answer -

I don't teach my children
to do any such thing."

On page 65 of the transcript the mother answered a question of Mr. Nelson, as follm.rs:
"I believe in teaching the principle of
the thing, but I am not saying I would teach
them to practice it."
Mr. Nelsonrs line of questioning on pages

69 and 70 and the mother's answers to his questions
clearly indicate that she has not counseled and
advised her children to enter into a plural relationship.

In fact, her answers indicates that

she feels the children are all too young to discuss
the subject with them.
On page 77 of the transcript the mother replied to the following question by the court:
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"And how will you counsel them?", as follows:
could counsel them

"I

to obey the laws of the land,

if they felt it was their duty to go otherwise why
that was their life."
On page 81 Orson Black was questioned by the
court, as follows:

"Has the subject of plural

marriage ever been discussed between you and either
of your parents, Orson?"

Orson replied:

"No, Sir."

There is ample testimony throughout the record
of this hearing showing that these parents have
actively encouraged their children to obey all
the laws.

That seems to be good parental advice.

It is not customary for parents to go down the
line of the statutes and affirmatively counsel
their children to obey each oneo

The children

of these parents are not going to be advised by
these parents to go out and break the law.
is ample testimony to this effect.

There

That they might

be taught the principle of celestial or plural

marriage, would not be a violation of any law on
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the part of the teacher.

If the teacher after

teaching this principle were then to say to his
listener "Now, go out and enter into a plural
marriage relationship. 11 and the listener then
did so in violation of law, the teacher would
then also be guilty of violating the law.

There

is no evidence that this has ever happened on
the part of these parents, and certainly it has
never happened in the case of the children before
the Juvenile Court in this matter.
There is a conclusion in Finding of Fact 14
that the parents' example is going to lead these
children into polygamy when they reach marriageable
age.

The court in that finding refers to the

parents' "own conduct and example in living in
polygamy. n

Yet the court in Finding of Fact 6,

in effect, found that they were not living in
polygamy at the time of the hearing and had not
been so living since July 24, 1953.

The Findings

of Fact do not square on these points.

These
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parents are not now living in polygamy; yet the
court says the example of their living will encourage their children to become polygamists.
Of course, Finding of Fact 14 also finds
that these parents "by associating themselves
with a religious group whose members practice
and advocate polygamy 11 encourage their children
to become polygamists.

In other words, the as-

sociation is what will lead these children to
become polygamists.

Even a cursory reading of

the history of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints prior to 1890 quickly shows
that even when that church actively encouraged
its members to enter polygamy a very small percentage of that church's membership were in the
plural marriage relationship.

The association

was not sufficient to encourage the great majority
of latter day saints in the days prior to 1890.
What is the justification for concluding that
association is going to do it in this day?
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It would seem, of course, that such a conclusion
was a necessary adjunct to there being any logic
in the Findings of Fact 17, 18, and 19 that these
children are being raised in an immoral environment, that their parents have neglected to provide
them with proper moral training and that, therefore,
the court is justified in taking the custody of
these children from their parents.

However nec-

essary the conclusion may be for the sake of logic,
it is certainly not a finding of fact supportable
by the testimony taken at this hearing or by re-

ference to any history of the situation, which
point of history is a matter of very common knowledge in Utah and of which the court could be
presumed to be aware.
Finding of Fact 17 is "That the home of
Leonard Black and Vera Johnson Black at Short
Creek, Utah, is an immoral environment for the
rearing of said children."

Such a finding is

not in accord with the testimony presented at
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the hearing.
Mr. Lauritzen in his testimony at page 97
of the transcript stated as to the people at
Short Creek:
I would say that I have never known,
and I have been around a great deal, a more
industrious people, a more honest a more
reliable people in every way I can think of
\vhere I would judge a character for integrity
and decency I would say these people in Short
Creek average higher than any people I know.
11

And on page 97 as to the character of Leonard
Black:
"I \vould say that he is as: moral a
character as I know, that is in the way of
decency and clean-mindedness.n
And on page 97 with reference to the mother
of these children:
"I must say that I know very little about
Vera or her home life and anything in regard
to her life at all, but I would say my impression of Vera is that she is a very clean,
fine woman and that she would be devoted to
her children."
And on page 105 with reference as to whether
the people of Short Creek were a happy people:
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"I have never seen a happier bunch of
people, unless it was in Harlem or down
South where they turned themselves loose and
sang and danced. I have often remarked to
my wife that those children, those families
seemed to be, from my outside standpoint,
seemed to be the most happy people I have
ever seen. Their lives are more wholesome
and purposeful than any I have seen. 11
This line of testimony was not controverted.
A mother who is devoted to her children does
not raise them in an immoral environment.

From

the testimony adduced Short Creek has a very moral
environment rather than contrary.
Finding of Fact 18 seems to state itself in
the words of the statute, but it does not state
something which can be supported in the record
before the court.

The record indicates that

these are very well-trained and well-behaved
children.

If they are not being given the proper

training from the standpoint of morals, they must
be immoral children.

Certainly a finding of

fact to that effect could not be supported.
If these children are not being properly trained,
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they should show tendencies toward delinquency,
one would think.

Who would be in a better posi-

tion to observe this than their school teacher?
Mrs. Lauritzen on page 112 of the transcript
of testimony was asked by Mr. Knowlton, "Do these
children show any tendencies toward delinquency?"
She answered, "No, they are very well-behaved
children."
Mrs. Lauritzen's testimony as to whether
in her opinion these children should be taken away
from their parents and from Short Creek appears
on page 114 of the transcript of testimony, as follows:
"I think that little children need security and love, and that security seems to come
from the lovf1a they feel in the home, and it
would be my opinion that they would surely
lose security and gather a great deal of complexes if they were taken from their homes.
I think the exuberance and happiness they have
when they get to school shows that there is
love in the home. It seems other complexes
would arise if they were taken from the home,
they wouldn't have this love and affection.''
This line of testimony was not controverted.
What it indicates is that this school teacher-mother,
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I

in an excellent position to observe these children,
felt their environment was sound, their training
and education quite adequate, and that they should
be left where they were.

The court did not agree,

however, with this uncontroverted testimony.
Finding of Fact 19 follows if Findings 14,
17, and 18 are proper.

These findings are im-

proper and are not supported by the evidence and
testimony taken at the hearing.
Conclusions of Law must be based upon the
Findings of Fact.

Where the Findings of Fact

necessary to support the Conclusions of Law are
in and of themselves unsupported by evidence and
testimony, such Conclusions of Law are erroneous,
and the Decree and Judgment of the court entered
upon such Findings of Facts and Conclusions of

Law will be reversed for error by the Supreme
Court of the state on appeal, as this court should
do in this case.
91
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CONCLUSION
We, therefore, submit that the Decree and
Judgment of the Court below is unconstitutional
and void as contrary to provisions of the Constitution of Utah and the Constitution of the United
States of America, that the Court erred in his
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that
this Court should reverse the Decree and Judgment
of the Court below.
Respectfully submitted,
HORA.CE J.
ROBERT J.
Attorneys
214 Tenth
Salt Lake

KNOWLTON
SCHUM
for Appellants
Avenue
City, Utah
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